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THREAT TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY BY THE WELFARE
STATE: AN ILLUSION
BRUCE FEIN*
Professor Richard Epstein's perception of a threat to religious
liberty with the advent of the welfare state is largely illusionary.1
Religious institutions and religious adherents enjoy sufficient polit-
ical clout to forestall the hypothesized evils Epstein depicts. Fur-
thermore, the federal judiciary is eminently capable of drawing
constitutional lines that protect against religious oppression, even
if those demarcations are not theoretically pure.
The United States has given constitutional blessing to the wel-
fare state since 1937.2 Moreover, by dramatic expansion of the con-
cept of interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has empowered
Congress to regulate such local activity as home consumption of
wheat 3 and loansharking.4 Thus, for virtually a half-century legisla-
tors have enjoyed the power to invade the autonomy of religious
institutions by wielding a general welfare sword.
If the welfare state were incompatible with religious liberty, one
would expect that by 1989 the death knell for the latter would
have rung. But religion is flourishing in the United States today.5
Church attendance and church affiliations are blossoming. Millions
of children attend religiously-affiliated elementary and secondary
schools, and sizeable numbers are enrolled in colleges and universi-
ties with sectarian sponsorship. Most churches are not starving for
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1. See Epstein, Religious Liberty in the Welfare State, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375
(1990).
2. Beginning with its decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937), the United States Supreme Court has shown a consistent willingness to treat defer-
entially those legislative enactments leading to the creation of a welfare state.
3. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
4. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
5. See R. ANTOUN & M. HEGLAND, RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE 236-51 (1987); C. GLOCK & R.
BELLAH, THE NEW RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS 333-66 (1976); YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN & CANA-
DIAN CHURCHES (C. Jacquet, Jr. ed. 1988).
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funds. Thus, putting aside constitutional doctrine, it seems at least
counterintuitive to believe that religious liberty is on a lethal colli-
sion course with a 50-year-old welfare state.
The religious affiliations of legislators and routine legislative ac-
commodation or sensitivity to religious institutions and creeds re-
inforce this skepticism. Virtually every member of Congress enjoys
some religious membership. In 1988, for instance, the two Virginia
Senators were Episcopalians, and of Virginia's ten House members,
two were Episcopalians, two were Baptists, two were Presbyteri-
ans, one was Jewish, one was Roman Catholic, one was Methodist,
and one was Unitarian.'
Federal legislation, unsurprisingly, is generally sympathetic to
religion. Thus, in the field of employment, a private employer is
barred from discrimination based on religious observance or prac-
tice unless he demonstrates that a reasonable accommodation
would impose an "undue hardship" on the conduct of the em-
ployer's business.' Moreover, section 702 of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act exempts religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition
against discrimination in employment on the basis of religion, in-
cluding work in their secular nonprofit activities.8
Conscientious objectors to war in any form are exempt from ser-
vice in the armed forces.9 Religious organizations operating educa-
tional institutions have been recipients of federal monies to further
secular aims, such as the construction of a college library. 10 Con-
gress recently mandated that public schools receiving federal funds
make their premises generally available for extracurricular activity
without discriminating against religion or religious practices." Re-
cipients of federal monies may not discriminate against any health
care personnel or physicians for refusing to assist or participate in
abortions because of religious convictions.' 2 In sum, if the welfare
state-monster is about to snuff out religious liberty, it seems to
have donned a brilliant disguise.
6. POLITICS IN AMERICA-THE 100TH CONGRESS 1547-78 (A. Ehrenhalt ed. 1987).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a) (1982).
8. Id. § 2000e-1.
9. 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1982).
10. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
11. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (Supp. V 1987).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1982).
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None of the cases examined by Epstein discredit that observa-
tion. In the area of collective bargaining, Epstein worries that if
the state is empowered to decide the scope of religious exemption
from labor law, then "pressures are put in place to make the scope
of religious freedom a good deal narrower" than if religious organi-
zations made the delineation. 3 But Epstein conspicuously fails to
identify these ominous "pressures."
Moreover, the NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago14 decision
that Epstein discusses is at war with that worry. At issue in that
case was whether federal labor laws empowered the National La-
bor Relations Board to hold union elections for the lay instructors
at several Catholic parochial schools, and if so, whether such intru-
sion on religious autonomy violated the free exercise clause of the
first amendment.' 5 The United States Supreme Court, a secular
arm of the state, held that Congress had exempted religiously affil-
iated elementary and secondary schools from the reach of its col-
lective bargaining laws.' 6 Since the ruling, Congress, another secu-
lar arm of the state, has forgone any effort to extend unionization
laws to religious schools.
Furthermore, providing an exemption from federal labor laws
does not confer a general advantage on religious schools over their
nonreligious counterparts. The latter are supported by the tax dol-
lars of parents with children enrolled in religious schools, and
those same parents also typically pay a hefty private tuition for
their children.
Where, then, is Epstein's hypothesized nightmare of a Mani-
chean battle between religious liberty and collective bargaining in
the welfare state?
Epstein goes astray when he insists that "[r]eligion conceived by
its practitioners may form a total and complete code of human
conduct that covers ordinary contracts of sale and employment
along with religious rituals."'" Contrariwise, few if any religious
creeds dictate a majority of an individual's choices, such as hair
grooming, wardrobe, breakfast cereal, television or radio program-
13. Epstein, supra note 1, at 382-83.
14. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 507.
17. Epstein, supra note 1, at 383.
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ming, occupation, newspapers, choice of friends, auto or house
purchases, or location of residence. How many religious creeds are
offended by a sales contract to purchase a gallon of gasoline for
$1.10?
In sum, occasions for conflict between religion and secular de-
mands are less impressive than Epstein postulates. Moreover, even
when a conflict does arise, subordinating a freedom of religion
claim to a countervailing interest of the state seldom, if ever, de-
stroys the core of an individual's religious life.
For instance, laws prohibiting polygamy have not materially in-
hibited the practice and growth of Mormonism. The Mormon
Church dropped polygamy as part of its official creed in 1890 in
response to a hostile political environment."8 But the Mormon reli-
gion thrives today, and the handful of adherents that insist on po-
lygamy ordinarily are ignored, not persecuted by law enforcement
officials. 9
Likewise, Jehovah's Witnesses did not wither when the Supreme
Court upheld application of child labor laws to bar the sales of
religious pamphlets by a youthful adherent of the sect.20 The High
Court did not crush the practice of Judaism when it rejected the
claim of an Orthodox Jewish merchant that he was due an exemp-
tion from Sunday closing laws because Saturday was his Sabbath,
and he would be economically disadvantaged by closing two days
in a week. 21 And the Amish have not vanished because of the hold-
ing in United States v. Lee22 that their religious claims could not
trump an obligation to pay social security taxes.
To recapitulate, the typical intersections of religion with the wel-
fare state are not as traumatic as Epstein suggests. When a claim
of religious freedom loses to a secular interest, the result is virtu-
ally never fairly characterized as religious oppression. Moreover,
Mormons were legislatively harassed generations before the advent
18. See N. ANDERSON, DESERT SAINTS 313-24 (1966); W.E. BERRETT, THE RESTORED
CHURCH 316-19 (1969).
19. See Japenga, Arizona Town's Uneasy Marriage To Polygamy; Accepted Religious
Tenet to Some Is An Oppressive Doctrine to Others, L.A. Times, Apr. 13, 1986, § 6, at 1,
col. 3.
20. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
21. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
22. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
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of the New Deal.23 The polygamy cases Epstein discusses24 thus are
no evidence that the welfare state threatens religious liberty.
Also noteworthy in evaluating freedom of religion claims is that
religious tenets are changeable. For instance, since its origin the
Roman Catholic Church has altered fundamental tenets in such
matters as papal infallibility, celibacy of the priesthood and the
centrality of the earth in the universe.25 In the future, women may
be admitted into the priesthood.26 The variability of religious
precepts undermines the claim that the basic concept of religion is
an invariable constellation of beliefs or practices that is fatally
wounded by any state-mandated change.
Epstein correctly responds: "It is one thing, however, for a reli-
gious institution to yield its traditions through internal change in
order to keep the consent and the loyalty of the governed. It is
quite another for outsiders to impose their own external standards
of right and wrong on these bodies. ' '27 But the danger of squelch-
ing religious liberty by enacting secular laws is dramatically re-
duced by invalidating those whose intent is anti-religious. When
anti-religious intent is lacking,2" religious adherents will be less
psychologically angered by a compelled subordination of a religious
practice to secular law. Further, the cases in which religious prac-
tice and secular mandates conflict will be infrequent because of the
impressive legislative clout wielded by religious organizations.
Concededly, the free exercise clause is intended to safeguard
against certain decisions by legislative majorities. That ideal may
be sullied when laws of the welfare state are sustained despite in-
23. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) (constitutional guarantee
of religious freedom does not prohibit legislation criminalizing polygamy); see also Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (concluding that Idaho statute declaring criminality of
bigamy and polygamy regardless of the religious nature of the offense was constitutional);
Romney v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1890) (statutory prohibition of polygamy does
not burden Mormons' free exercise rights).
24. Epstein, supra note 1, at 385-86.
25. See J. DOLAN, THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE, A HISTORY FROM COLONIAL TIMES
To THE PRESENT 429-54 (1985).
26. See Woman Consecrated as Episcopal Bishop, Boston Globe, Feb. 12, 1989, at 1; A
New Priest Leaves Home For Ministry, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1981, at 27, col. 1; "Women
Preachers"--The Fight Rages On, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 16, 1975, at 30.
27. Epstein, supra note 1, at 402.
28. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (tax exempt status
denied a religious school practicing racial discrimination).
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terference with a religious tenet. But a few wrong-headed decisions
or misguided constitutional doctrines are not the equivalent of
crushing religious liberty.
Epstein's examination of the first amendment's establishment
clause reinforces that conclusion. He worries that welfare state
statutes may force the nonreligious to subsidize the religious,
which would violate the strict Madisonian view that persons
should not be taxed to support a religion they abhor. 9
Epstein argues: "Forcing the nonreligious to subsidize the reli-
gious . . . injects the possibility of one-way transfers across the
deep divide of separate factions or groups-a recipe for political
dynamite."' 0 But if religious groups are so politically potent as to
force redistribution of wealth to themselves by statute, why does
Epstein assume they are politically impotent to prevent free exer-
cise violations by legislatures? Moreover, the cases of redistribu-
tion he cites are laughably inconsequential.31
In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,32 for instance,
the Supreme Court denied an establishment clause challenge to an
exemption afforded religious organizations by Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. The exemption permitted the Mormon Church to
discharge a building engineer working in a school gymnasium oper-
ated by the Mormons because he was not sufficiently attached to
Mormonism.3 The result in Amos provided the Mormons with an
advantage over nonreligious organizations under the Civil Rights
Act, but its monetary or competitive value was virtually nil.
At issue in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,34 was a state law
prohibiting an employer from discharging an employee who re-
fused to work on his chosen Sabbath: The Court invalidated the
law on the ground that it promoted religious over nonreligious con-
victions in the workplace in violation of the establishment clause. 5
Epstein applauds the decision because the statute placed "religious
individuals at a systematic competitive advantage over their non-
29. Epstein, supra note 1, at 391.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 393-406.
32. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
33. Id. at 330.
34. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
35. Id. at 708-09.
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religious rivals."3 6 But a hyperactive imagination would be re-
quired to place the monetary value of the advantage beyond a few
peppercorns.
In Sherbert v. Verner,37 the Court reviewed the denial of unem-
ployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist because she refused
to work on her Sabbath. The free exercise clause, the Court rea-
soned, proscribed the denial because it placed a monetary penalty
on religious practice.38 Epstein worries that the result might yield a
redistribution of wealth from the nonreligious to the religious
worker in violation of the establishment clause if the unemploy-
ment records of both groups are identical, except for joblessness
caused by refusals to work for religious reasons. 9 But the size of
the possible redistribution would be tiny at best.
Epstein is profoundly chagrined that the free exercise and estab-
lishment clause doctrines fashioned by the Supreme Court are logi-
cally untidy and too loose to prevent hypothesized legislative
abuses. He deplores the somewhat arbitrary weighing of religious
claims against countervailing secular interests.4 °
But the Constitution is an instrument of practical government.
Its goals include the preservation of liberty and the advancement
of the general welfare, even if constitutional interpretations speak-
ing to these occasionally antagonistic ends seem theoretically
adulterated to the scholar. Epstein fails to demonstrate that either
the politics of the welfare state or High Court rulings portend any
material stifling of religious liberty. As Justice Miller instructed in
United States v. Lee:41
Hypothetical cases of great evils may be suggested by a particu-
larly fruitful imagination in regard to almost every law upon
which depends the rights of the individual or of the government,
and if the existence of laws is to depend upon their capacity to
withstand such criticism, the whole fabric of the law must fail.42
36. Epstein, supra note 1, at 404.
37. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
38. Id. at 403-06.
39. Epstein, supra note 1, at 405.
40. Id. at 397-99.
41. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
42. Id. at 217.
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In addition, drawing somewhat arbitrary lines between compet-
ing interests is the essence of constitutional adjudication. Most dis-
tinctions of law are distinctions of degree. As Justice Holmes
taught in Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter:
43
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical
extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of prin-
ciples of policy which are other than those on which the particu-
lar right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold
their own when a certain point is reached."
Thus, in response to an argument that the power to tax was tanta-
mount to the power to destroy in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi
ex rel. Knox," Justice Holmes answered: "[N]ot . . . while this
court sits."'46
If anyone is seeking to author an epitaph for religious liberty in
the United States, he should plan on several lifetimes of
unemployment.
43. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
44. Id. at 355.
45. 277 U.S. 218 (1928).
46. Id. at 223 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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